Does rivalry influence selective reporting in scientific publications? We define ?rivalry? as a subset of competition that captures the subjective relationships between two competitors. Using data on headto-head clinical trials for antidepressants, we find that the likelihood of selectively reporting drugs' side effects in scientific articles is higher when the drugs investigated in the trial are rivals rather than nonrival opponents. We also find partial support for our arguments that this effect is strengthened when the scientific team includes a firm scientist, and weakened when the focal drug pre-empted the rival drug at market entry. Our study is novel in that it is the first study that explores the link between rivalry, product-market competition, and the content of scientific articles. By revealing conditions that are likely to trigger a ?dark side? in publication practices, our study provides counterintuitive insights at the interplay between competition and science: What seems to be a practice aimed at mitigating uncertainty, i.e., the release of scientific information in product-market competition, can under some conditions enhance behavioral uncertainty and result in increased risk taking for firms that undertake comparative research.
INTRODUCTION
Engaging in science is recognized as an important element for firms to compete (e.g., Polidoro Jr and Theeke, 2012, Polidoro Jr, 2013) . For instance, scientific publishing helps firms build capabilities to take advantage of external science (Gambardella, 1992, Arora and Gambardella, 1994) , exploit opportunities in advance of others (Cockburn et al., 2000) , attract human capital (e.g., Stern, 2004, Sauermann and Roach, 2014) , prevent others from patenting related innovations (Della Malva and Hussinger, 2012) , and provides a strategic instrument to influence the external assessments of innovations in product-market competition (Azoulay, 2002, Polidoro Jr and .
Although significant insights have been gleaned from such studies, the literature has largely focused on whether and when firms publish. Less is known about what is revealed in scientific articles and what isn't. In particular, scholars have yet to provide insights on the link between competition and the content of firms' scientific publications. This is important given that firms have both the means to purposely address what is included in their scientific publications (e.g., Blumenthal et al., 1996 , Czarnitzki et al., 2014 and the competitive motives to do so (e.g., Grimm and Smith, 1997; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Polidoro Jr and Theeke, 2012) . In the pharmaceutical industry, for instance, scientific information is strategically targeted to persuade physicians to favor a drug over a rival treatment (Azoulay, 2002 , Berndt et al., 2002 and, in response to competitive situations, some firms reduce the information content about drug outcomes in discussions with physicians (Kappe and Stremersch, 2016) . While the suppression or carefully crafting of scientific information may help the firm to compete against rivals, an exclusion of critical research findings in publication can turn out to be harmful for users of innovations and costly for the firm. For example, in 2012, drug maker GlaxoSmithKline suffered high reputational damages while being forced to pay a $3 billion fine in response to a number of charges including the firm's involvement in a scientific paper that misreported clinical evidence (New York Times, 2012) .
The purpose of this paper is to explore how rivalry influences the likelihood of poor or incomplete reporting of research in scientific publications that investigate competing innovations. The partial reporting of research outcomes, known as selective reporting (e.g., Dwan et al., 2013) , has been recognized as an increasingly common practice across a number of fields, with clinical research being an area of particular concern (e.g., Dwan et al., 2013) .
Building on recent work (Kilduff et al., 2010 , Kilduff et al., 2016 , we define "rivalry" as a subset of competition that captures the subjective relationships between two competitors. We argue that when factors that contribute to the formation of rivalry (namely: similarity, repeated interaction, and competitiveness) are in place, then investigators may be pushed outside generally accepted norms of behavior, in turn leading to increased chances of selective reporting in the firms' scientific publications. We also propose that the effect of rivalry on selective reporting is influenced by two moderators, firm scientist and leadership at entry, which characterize boundary conditions of our key argument.
The nature of our research question raises the empirical challenge of identifying poor reporting of the focal firm's information on its technologies (here: what is and isn't included in scientific publications reporting the results of the firm's research projects). To address this challenge, we make use of expert-driven assessments of selective reporting in clinical research publications. Our dataset pertains to scientific articles presenting the results of comparative trials of pharmaceutical drugs. In such setting, a pair of drugs (or a dyad) participates in repeated head-to-head competition across a number of studies, allowing us to capture sources of relational and historical rivalry.
In our results, we find that different sources of rivalry (i.e., repeated interaction, competitiveness) increase the likelihood of selective reporting. We find partial support for our proposed moderation effects (i.e., firm scientist, leadership at entry). While our empirical insights require more detailed investigation, they allow us to make important contributions to the literature. First, by answering calls for more research on the "dark side" of rivalry (Kilduff et al., 2016) , we complement prior work that has largely looked at drivers and outcomes of visible competitive actions in head-to-head rivalry (Ferrier, 2001, Ross and . We find that rivalry can shape the use of invisible elements of such actions, such as withholding information to keep a rival at bay (e.g., Smith, 1997, Chen and Hambrick, 1995) , and reveal novel sources of heterogeneity that influence competitive actions.
Second, by exploring the extent to which rivalry influences what is (and isn't) reported in firms' publications, we enhance our understanding of the role of science in firms'
attempts to obtain a knowledge-based competitive advantage. We uncover a novel trade-off at the interplay between competition and science with counterintuitive insights: What seems to be a practice aimed at mitigating uncertainty i.e., the release of scientific information in product-market competition , can under some conditions enhance behavioral uncertainty and result in increased risk taking.
Finally, we add to the list of factors that inform the quality and completeness of the reporting in scientific publications (e.g., Fanelli, 2009 , Franco et al., 2014 . Specifically, while insightful about the prevalence of incomplete publications, much of prior work is limited in predicting heterogeneity in selective reporting (e.g., Chan et al., 2004 , Dwan et al., 2013 , Salandra, 2018 . By identifying rivalry as a crucial factor that relates to such behavior, we add to the broader debates on the antecedents of scientific misconduct (Lacetera and Zirulia, 2009, e.g., Biagioli et al., 2018) and factors that inhibit knowledge accumulation (Murray and O'Mahony, 2007) .
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Rivalry and head-to-head competition "Competition" is commonly understood as a situation in which the outcomes of actors are opposed and gains of one actor become the losses of the other (e.g., Deutsch, 1949) , such as attempts to increase market share or gain access to scarce resources. Strategy scholars have studied competition at different units of analyses, for example at the level of the industry (Porter, 1980) , strategic group (McGee and Thomas, 1986) or competitive action (Grimm and Smith, 1997) . Competitive dynamics research explores antecedents and consequences of competitive actions and responses, in which market-based moves (e.g., marketing, new product, signaling) are designed to enhance or defend the relative competitive position in head-to-head rivalry (e.g., Ferrier, 2001; Smith et al., 2001) .
Whereas the word "rival" often simply refers to all actors within a competition (Cool and Dierickx, 1993, Katila and Chen, 2008) , some studies define rivals as a subset of competitors based on structural characteristics, such as currently similar position and performance rank (Ferrier et al., 1999 , Bothner et al., 2007 , or based on subjective factors that shape the perception of each other as "bitter rivals" (Kilduff et al., 2010) . Building on the idea of a dynamic interplay between pairs of firms over time, Chen et al. (2007) found that recent exchanges of competitive moves can influence the perceived tension toward a rival. While this work links current relative characteristics and recent attacks to competitive tension and response, colleagues (2010, 2019) point out that repeated competition intensifies relational rivalry due to socio-psychological factors.
As such, instead of structural characteristics and objective threats, heightened psychological stakes of competition between a pair of actors are result of historical experiences with competitive interactions, such as status similarity, repeated competitions, and historically evenly-matched competitions. Such subjective intensity of rivalry has been linked to increased motivation to win, risk taking, and aggressiveness (Kilduff et al., 2010 , Kilduff, 2014 , Kilduff, 2019 . As such form of rivalry intensifies the focus on outperforming an opponent and shifts attention away from the means to achieve such goals, it can also promote unethical behavior (Kilduff et al., 2016, Kilduff and Galinsky, 2017) Less is known about how rivalry 1 shapes the information content in technological competition, e.g., when seeking to influence the external assessment of innovations by market participants (Thompson, 1967 , Nelson and Winter, 1982 , Anderson and Tushman, 1990 ). However, evidence suggests that competitive relationships may inform the way firms communicate scientific facts about their innovations. For instance, some firms reduce information content on unflattering product features in their messaging strategies when facing increased competition from rival product offerings (Kappe and Stremersch, 2016) . Though competitive dynamics research refers to information manipulation in competitive actions (Grimm and Smith, 1997) , it is less clear whether rivalry triggers such behavior. As the competitive dynamics literature has largely looked at visible actions (Chen and Miller, 2012) ,
our understanding of what firms reveal and what they don't reveal in publicly available information remains limited. This is largely because of the empirical difficulty of observing firms' invisible assets (e.g., accumulated information on available technologies), which are crucial to study antecedents of competitive actions (Jacobson, 1992, Roberts and Eisenhardt, 2003) .
In this study, we build on the idea that competitive actions provide a vehicle to release information to market participants, such as information on what innovation is most effective, and exposing incorrect information (Grimm and Smith, 1997 , Smith and Di Gregorio, 2002 , Smith and Cao, 2007 . We posit that decision makers adjust the information content of such market-based actions. When trying to get or stay ahead of each other, competitors are "forced to sweeten still further the opportunities they make available to the market [and thus] …gravitate closer and closer to the limits of their ability to participate gainfully in the market" (Kirzner, 1973: 12) . As a decision maker's drive to improve marketplace performance in such a process is influenced by competition between rivals (Dickson, 1992) , we argue that rivalry may play a role in shaping the way firms approach the release of information in market-based actions. To study this, we examine the case of selective reporting of drugs' side effects in publications of head-to-head clinical trials. Before building our hypotheses, we describe the phenomenon of interest i.e. selective reporting.
Firm's scientific publications and the selective reporting of drugs' side effects
The market success of firms' innovations often depends on the favorable assessments received from outside parties. In the pharmaceutical setting, external parties include regulators (e.g., the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the USA), who assess the efficacy and safety of drugs, and physicians, who evaluate approved treatments before prescribing them to patients. Pharmaceutical firms can influence such assessments by publishing scientific articles in top journals (Polidoro Jr, 2013) . Indeed, studies have shown that scientific papers provide important information to signal drugs' underlying quality (Avorn et al., 1982 , Jones et al., 2001 and that drugs' market uptake is influenced by scientific evidence (Azoulay, 2002) .
Given these insights, the decision to include certain pieces of knowledge and to withhold others may reflect firms' strategic behavior in product-market competition. For instance, in responses to increased uncertainty about how an incumbent drug differentiates from a new entrant, firms may reduce discussions on drug contradictions (e.g., side effects) in sales calls with doctors (Kappe and Stremersch, 2016) .
With regard to the dissemination of information in scientific journals, ample evidence suggests that publication bias and inadequate reporting are common, particularly so in clinical research (Chalmers and Glasziou, 2009) . Various questionable practices have been detected, ranging from the lack of publication of entire studies (Lexchin et al., 2003 , Bekelman et al., 2003 , Lee et al., 2008 , McGauran et al., 2010 , Song et al., 2010 , Riveros et al., 2013 to the selective reporting of study findings (Chan et al., 2004 , Chan and Altman, 2005 , Dwan et al., 2013 . Although poor reporting can affect several study outcomes, the incomplete reporting of drugs' side effects has attracted growing attention Lau, 2001, Pitrou et al., 2009) : While many academic studies have provided evidence that this practice is both highly prevalent and potentially dangerous (Ioannidis and Lau, 2001 , Loke and Derry, 2001 , Ioannidis, 2009 , Golder et al., 2016 , Schroll et al., 2016 , notable cases have increased awareness of biased reporting amongst the general public. Prominent examples include that of the VIGOR study; the research article presenting the study's findings failed to describe irregular procedures, in turn favoring rofecoxib (Vioxx)'s outcomes while understating its risk (Krumholz et al., 2007) . Another case is that of the Health Technology Assessment (HTA) report on reboxetine, where the inclusion of unpublished data called into question the previous positive conclusions about the drug's benefits and harms (Eyding et al., 2010) .
Although publication bias is not limited to firms' scientific publications (e.g., Ross et al., 2012) , evidence suggests that industry-led articles are more likely to report positive outcomes compared to privately-funded studies (e.g., Lexchin et al., 2003 , Bekelman et al., 2003 . Indeed, with regard to the reporting of drugs' side effects, the examples illustrated above show that firms' objectives towards transparency may be in contrast with their commercial interests, e.g., pressures to put their drugs under a good light. These pressures are particularly high in head-to-head studies, which involve a direct comparison between two or more drugs. As opposed to placebo-controlled trials, which are usually conducted to meet regulatory needs (e.g., to gain market approval), head-to-head trials are largely voluntarily initiated by pharmaceutical firms and used as a competitive tool to demonstrate their drugs' advantages over rival treatments. Indeed, extant evidence has confirmed such behavior, and that published results from head-to-head trials are more likely to favor the firm sponsoring the comparative assessment (Flacco et al., 2015) .
Overall, we expect that strategic withholding scientific information (namely: drugs' side effects) in publications relative to comparative trials will be informed by firms' drive to present their innovations in a favorable light. Whereas previous work has identified the strategic removal of information in publications as a mechanism to minimize loss of knowledge, maintain secrecy, and delay information sharing (Nelson, 2016) , we build on the notion that the incentive to encourage adoption of innovations can be another motive for excluding certain research outcomes in publication. In the next section, we develop arguments that link rivalry, product-market competition, and content of scientific articles.
Rivalry and selective reporting
Empirical research on rivalry has identified different sources that explain why and how such form of rivalry emerges. First, independent of greater objective threats due to competition for scarce resources (Chen et al., 2007) , similarity among competitors can increase subjective perception of competitiveness (Kilduff et al., 2010) and result in amplified pressures towards social comparison (e.g., Festinger, 1954) . In the context of science projects, investigators try to avoid being assessed by outside parties as promoters of studies that show no difference (Leon, 2011, Vieta and Cruz, 2012) , and comparing similar innovations increases the pressure to show uniqueness and superiority of one of them (Polidoro Jr and Theeke, 2012) .
Thus, perceived benefits of selective reporting may be higher for studies aimed at reducing uncertainty on the comparative performance relative to two treatments that are similar, as opposed to studies investigating less comparable treatments.
Increased feelings of rivalry can also be a result of repeated interaction between actors over past contests (Kilduff et al., 2010; Kilduff, 2014) . Repeated exposure to an opponent accumulates competitive stimuli over time and fosters subjective importance of relative performance outcomes. Competition against such rival attracts external attention and social comparison, influencing their self-esteem to a greater extent than competition against nonrivals ( Kilduff et al., 2016) . Such increased focus on competitive outcomes shifts internal attention towards practices that facilitate these goals and away from concern on whether the approach is scientifically sound. In the context of scientific publication, increased focus on relative performance may reduce potential doubts regarding the engagement in practices, such as the selective reporting of side effects, which violate scientific and social norms e.g., relative to reporting standards and research transparency.
Finally, prior contests that have been decided by small margins create stronger emotional reactions than clear-cut victories, increasing feelings of rivalry and desire to win (Kilduff et al., 2010) . In antagonistic drug trials, evenly-matched competitions between drugs in the past may create expectations for future close contests, in turn increasing external assessors' uncertainty about alternative innovations. Consequently, when aiming for improvements in competitive position, a contestant will attempt to score well on elements that are visible for external assessors judging about fitness for future action (e.g., Thompson, 1967) . Taken together, we expect that when factors that contribute to the formation of rivalry, (such as similarity, repeated competition, and competitiveness), are in place, then selective reporting will be more likely. Thus, we posit:
Hypothesis 1: Rivalry increases the likelihood of selective reporting in scientific publications that investigate competing drugs.
Moderating effect of firm scientist
Firms' involvement in drug trials is complex, ranging from sponsorship and donation of the drug used in the study, to input in the design and conduct of the research, to the analysis and publication of results. Individual scientists may also be subject to a range of personal financial interests, including employment and honoraria. Prior works on the antecedents of bias in publication and reporting have highlighted the importance of distinguishing among these various forms of involvement (van Lent et al., 2013 , Ahn et al., 2017 , with evidence that selective reporting is more likely in publications with at least one firm-affiliated contributor (Salandra, 2018) .
We expect that in addition to directly affecting the likelihood of selective reporting, the presence of a firm employee in the scientific team will strengthen the positive relationship between rivalry and the chances of selective reporting. Specifically, we anticipate that employment will reinforce scientists' response to the additional subjective perception of competitiveness because, as firm scientists, they would be socialized into the rivalries (Ashforth et al., 2007 , Kilduff, 2019 . By contrast, when the research team includes only academic scientists, which are less integrated into the stories and competitive narratives, we expect selective reporting to be less likely to be influenced by relational rivalry. Therefore:
Hypothesis 2: The positive effect of relational rivalry on selective reporting in scientific publications that investigate competing drugs will be stronger for studies that involve a firm scientist.
Moderating effect of leadership at entry
Research has argued that in a competitive context, competitive actions can be considered as creative initiatives (Hambrick et al., 1996, Smith and Di Gregorio, 2002) . The amount of attention that such actions receive in the marketplace can depend on their noteworthiness. For followers, who try to catch up with a market leader, it is crucial to "create" actions that help disrupt status quo (e.g., Ferrier et al., 1999; Ferrier, 2001) , such as increasing the perceived potential amount of customers influenced by a competitive action (Chen et al., 1992) and exposing incorrect information that indicate (seemingly) wide avenues for the competitive action (Smith and Di Gregorio, 2002) .
In the context of pharmaceutical drugs, a follower tries to provide a drug with better attributes than the first mover, such as fewer side-effects (Berndt et al., 2003 , Azoulay, 2002 , Vieta and Cruz, 2012 . A leader may instead select more defensive tactics to maintain their competitive position (Livengood and Reger, 2010, Ross and . We argue that historical leadership will weaken the positive relationship between rivalry and selective reporting. We expect that increased relational rivalry will create a challenge for the leader because external stakeholders are likely to focus on information of the leader. Since the socially defined identity of the leader may be at stake (e.g., if they are caught misreporting),
we expect that the perceived cost of selective reporting when facing increased rivalry will outweighs the potential benefits of such behavior. We posit:
Hypothesis 3: The positive effect of relational rivalry on selective reporting in scientific publications that investigate competing drug will be weakened for studies in which the focal drug entered the market before the rival drug.
DATA AND METHODS

Study context
We chose head-to-head clinical trials for antidepressant drugs as the focus of the study.
Depression is to date the leading cause of disability across the world (Kassebaum et al., 2016) . While the first antidepressant was discovered in the 1950s, the prescribing of antidepressants rose dramatically in the 1990s, mainly as a result of the launch of Prozac, the first available selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI). Prozac quickly became a "blockbuster" and one of the biggest selling drugs in the pharmaceutical industry.
Although many different agents are now available amongst antidepressants, such as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) and serotonin-noradrenaline reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs), the optimal treatment for depression is unclear, due to a lack of understanding of the effectiveness and tolerability of the individual drugs (Cipriani et al., 2018) . The debate about the effectiveness of antidepressants has been fueled by studies providing evidence that publication bias and selective reporting are widespread in antidepressants trials (e.g., Ioannidis, 2008; Moreno et al., 2009; Turner, Matthews, Linardatos, Tell, & Rosenthal, 2008) .
Due to the importance of the condition and the size of the market, pharmaceutical firms are highly involved in conducting research on antidepressants. Indeed, extant studies suggest that in the broader field of psychiatry industry sponsorship and financial conflict of interest significantly shape how clinical trials are conducted and reported (Perlis et al., 2005) .
Given the availability of multiple treatment options, antidepressants trials also frequently involve a head-to-head design. Prior works suggest that antidepressants sales are more responsive to physicians' perceptions of side effects than to perceived effectiveness (Berndt et al., 2002) . Thus, achieving favorable results with regard to drugs' side effects is particularly important in antagonistic antidepressants trials. Common side effects associated with antidepressant treatment include nausea, dry mouth, sweating, insomnia, sexual dysfunction, and weight gain (Crawford et al., 2014) . Taken together, this setting provides us with a unique opportunity to explore the influences of relational rivalry on the selective reporting of research findings.
Data
Our data on head-to-head antidepressants studies and the selective reporting of side effects were collected from the Database of Systematic Reviews maintained by Cochrane, a British not-for-profit organization that is leader in the field of systematic reviews of healthcare interventions.
2 Cochrane review authors collect all available evidence on a certain topic, for example all trials exploring the use of a given drug to treat a certain condition, and present the results in a systematic review. The methodological quality of all appraised studies is also assessed in the review, based on five characteristics that may introduce a risk of bias (i.e., systematic error) in each publication (Higgins & Green, 2011) . Importantly for our study, a key aspect investigated in Cochrane reviews is the selective reporting of research data. To identify missing outcomes, reviewers undertake a number of pre-defined steps including looking for any discrepancies between the research protocol and the publication, as well as for incongruencies within the publication itself.
We focused on the systematic reviews registered with the Mental Health Cochrane Review Group and compiled by the Meta-Analyses of New Generation Antidepressants Study Group (MANGA Study Group). As of July 2017, the MANGA Study group had completed 9 reviews, discussing the 9 antidepressants fluoxetine (Magni et al., 2013) , paroxetine (Purgato et al., 2014) , sertraline , escitalopram (Cipriani et al., 2009) , milnacipran , fluvoxamine (Omori et al., 2010) , mirtazapine , duloxetine (Cipriani et al., 2012) and citalopram (Cipriani et al., 2012) . Critically, the MANGA Study Group decided to only include antagonistic comparisons in these reviews, i.e., studies that compare a reference antidepressant agent (for example, fluoxetine) with a selection of possible comparator antidepressants. This selection allowed us to build our dataset of head-to-head trials, each matched to the main scientific publication reporting the study's results.
After excluding all duplicates, we accessed the full-text versions to collect any information on funding and conflicts of interest e.g., from acknowledgements, footnotes, and conflict of interest statements. Our final dataset includes 395 papers published in medical journals between 1983 and 2012. We matched the data with information gathered from several other sources e.g., FDA datasets, Scopus, and IMS Lifecycle.
Dependent variable
For each publication in the sample, we identified the presence of selective reporting relying on data collected from the Cochrane Library. Cochrane reviewers provide a risk of bias rating due to selective reporting for each of the appraised publication, as well as a free text comment describing potential concerns regarding the completeness of the reporting. For our dependent variable (Selective reporting), we created a dummy variable taking the value 1 if
Cochrane reviewers referred to the selective reporting of side effects in their text comments, and 0 otherwise. Typical comments ranged from "Only a few side effects reported" to "Only adverse effects occurring in at least 10% of the sample were reported" or "Side effects not reported".
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Independent variables
For each of the papers included in the sample, we measured rivalry at the level of the dyad of drugs investigated in the trial, i.e. rivalry between the treatment and control drug. We built three measures that relate to the antecedents of rivalry: similarity, repeated interaction and competitiveness (Kilduff et al., 2010) .
Similarity. We created a variable equal to 1 if the two drugs discussed in the focal publication had the same mechanism of action, 0 otherwise. In other words, we considered whether the two drugs were in the same sub-class (for example, two SSRIs) or whether they belonged to different sub-classes (e.g., a SSRIs competing against a SNRIs). A similar approach was adopted by Polidoro Jr and Theeke (2012). Information on the mechanism of action was gathered using the World Health Organization (WHO) ATC classification system for antidepressants (coded as NOA6A).
Repeated interaction. Kilduff et al. (2010) measure repeated competition between NCAA Men's Basketball team as the number of games played between teams. Analogously, we considered each head-to-head study as a competitive encounter between drugs. We created a variable equal to the number of papers investigating the same pair of drugs as the focal publication and published before the focal paper. For example, for an article comparing head-to-head fluoxetine and paroxetine, we would consider the count of all the publications that included a comparison of fluoxetine and paroxetine, and that were published before the focal paper. Since Cochrane authors systematically search for and appraise all the published studies that investigate the drugs included in the review, we used the list of publications included in each review as a source of information for prior publications. The variable was log transformed to correct for skewness.
Competitiveness. Kilduff et al. (2010) assess the competitiveness between basketball teams by looking at how close the historic match-up between teams is to a 50-50 split, as measured via historical head-to-head winning percentages (competitiveness index). In a similar way, to devise a proxy for competitiveness in the context of clinical trials, we considered the head-to-head 'winning' percentages of the inferior drug (i.e., the drug that achieved favorable results in fewer trials) over the history of trials conducted between the two drugs. For each prior trial, we defined 'winning' as achieving a better safety performance than the competing drug in a given trial. 4 Within Cochrane reviews, relative safety performance is reported in terms of Odds Ratio (OR) i.e., the ratio of the percentage of patients that leave treatment after taking the treatment drug to the percentage of patients that leave treatment after taking the competing drug (Higgins & Green, 2011; Loke, Price, & Herxheimer, 2007) . Since the outcome (patients leaving treatment) is undesirable, a favorable performance for the focal drug is indicated by an Odds Ratio lower than 1. The resulting
Competitiveness index ranges from 0 (fully unbalanced match-up) to 50 (even match-up).
We built two additional variables to test for the proposed interaction effects. First, we considered whether or not at least one author listed in the focal publication had a professional affiliation to a pharmaceutical company (Firm scientist=1). This information was retrieved from Scopus. Second, we defined leadership based on order of entry of the competing drugs.
For each publication, we treated the treatment drug as the first mover (First mover =1) if the drug was approved before the competing drug assessed in the same research project.
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Control variables
We controlled for several potential sources of heterogeneity across observations, considering various characteristics that could influence both the chances of selective reporting and competition at the level of the trial, of the publication, of the focal drug and of the associated firm. At the level of the clinical study, we included Trial size (the log transformation of the number of enrolled participants) and Trial duration (the log transformation of the number of weeks).
At the level of the publication, we controlled for Journal quality (the log transformation of impact factors from Journal Citation Reports of the Institute for Scientific 4 Performance outcomes in clinical trials fall broadly into two categories, efficacy (e.g., how many patients respond to treatment) and safety (e.g., how many patients leave treatment). Although we focused on safety, we assessed the effect of efficacy performance in robustness checks. 5 Drugs that did not receive FDA approval for depression were always treated as followers. At the level of the focal drug, we controlled for whether the FDA assigned New Molecular Entity status to the drug application (New molecule). This is a proxy of the novelty of the drug, which may influence the chances of selective reporting (e.g., Salandra, 2018). To identify trials conducted before and after market approval, we also added a dummy variable
Post approval that was set to 1 for all trials run after the drug's FDA approval and 0 otherwise. As a few drugs in the sample were not approved by the FDA for the use in depression, e.g. fluvoxamine, the corresponding publications were indicated as Not FDA
Approved.
At the level of the firm associated to the trial, we relied on conflict of statement disclosures to gather information on the trial sponsors. For a small number of trials, the source of sponsorship was certainly not industry (e.g., there was a clear statement of financial support from a public body) or we could not access the full text to examine sponsorship.
These were included in the sample but separately flagged to account for any heterogeneity (Other sponsor and Unknown sponsor). To capture potential differences across firms such as resource availability, which may have an impact on publication practices, the model includes a measure of firm size. Using data from annual reports and COMPUSTAT and Amadeus, we measured firm size as the yearly number of employees (in thousands) for each firm, calculated at the time of publication of each article and log-transformed (Firm size). We also controlled for whether the firm was headquartered in the USA (Firm HQ USA).
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Lastly, since we intend to study the effect of rivalry independent of tangible stakes,
we included in the model additional variables relative to scientific and market competition.
At the level of the drug, We controlled for the presence of scientific articles about similar drugs, which may influence firms' propensity to publish (Polidoro Jr & Theeke, 2012) .
Specifically, we included the number of publications about antidepressant drugs that build on the same mechanism of action as the focal drug, excluding publications about the focal drug itself (Publications on similar drugs). This information was extracted from PubMed by searching for the generic drug names. We counted publications in the two years prior to the observation year and used a logarithmic transformation to adjust for skewness. At the level of the firm, we controlled for multimarket contact between the firm sponsoring the interventional drug and the manufacturer of the treatment drug. We used information from the IMS Lifecycle dataset, which provides fine-grained data on R&D projects for a large number of pharmaceutical firms. For each of the firms included in the dataset, we extracted the research pipeline and focused only on marketed projects, thus extracting the number of drugs marketed by each firm across different therapeutic areas. Since product-market competition in the context of pharmaceutical drugs could also be influenced by structural competition and mutual forbearance (Shankar, 1999) we measured Multimarket contact as the count of all the therapeutic areas (excluding mental health) in which the two firms associated to a trial (i.e. the manufacturer of the treatment and the manufacturer of the control drug) were operating in the focal year. Since the IMS dataset covers the period from 1985 to 2009, some observations could not be matched and were accordingly identified with a dummy Multimarket contact NA (=1 measure not available).
Despite our efforts to control for the potential sources of heterogeneity, there is the possibility that unobserved processes not captured in our controls may systematically affect certain sub-classes of drugs (e.g. SSRIs, SNRIs, and so forth), or example by influencing publications or competition within the sub-class. To address this concern, we controlled for time-invariant heterogeneity across sub-classes by including in the model sub-class dummies, relative to both the treatment and control drug in each publication. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics. The incidence of side effects selective reporting in the sample merits comment: the analyzed sample reveals that 40% of publications were subject to the selective reporting. The correlations between the variables, not reported here,
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics
are not of concern regarding multicollinearity. Table 1 about here Table 2 presents the estimates of the influence of rivalry on the chances of selective reporting drugs' side effects in a scientific publication. Since our dependent variable is binary, we applied logistic regression with standard errors clustered by Cochrane review (9 clusters). Table 2 about here
---------------------------
Regression results
As we expected, repeated interaction and competitiveness were highly correlated.
Model 1 reports the baseline model including only the control variables. Hypothesis 1 proposes that selective reporting will be more likely when competitors are rival. First, we investigated the effect of the Similarity between the investigate drugs on the likelihood of selective reporting. The negative and significant coefficient of similarity in Model 2 suggests that if a drug is in the same sub-class as its opponent, the chances of selective reporting are significantly lower, relative to trials that compare drugs in different sub-classes. In the discussion we offer some explanations for this result that contradicts our predictions. Next, we looked at Repeated interaction. Model 3 indicates that the more trials the dyad of drugs has engaged in historically, as measured by the available prior publications, the higher the chances of selective reporting (positive and significant coefficient), thus supporting our prediction. Lastly, we looked at the Competitiveness. Consistent with our expectations, the coefficient of the competitiveness index reported in Model 4 is positive and significant. Table 3 about here
---------------------------
In Table 3 we added the interaction terms of repeated interaction with firm scientist and first mover. 8 Since the marginal effect of an interaction between two variables in a logit model cannot be evaluated looking at the magnitude, sign or significance of the coefficient for their interaction, we also used the 'intgphcommand' command in STATA to graph the two interactions (Zelner, 2009 ). These preliminary investigations indicated that, even though the estimated effects on the main relationship between rivalry and selective reporting are in line with our prediction, with the effect being higher when there is a firm employee and lower when the focal drug is the first mover, in the interaction charts the 95 per cent confidence intervals were separate for certain values of rivalry, but overlapped for other values. Thus, we find only partial support for our moderation effects.
Additional analysis and robustness checks
The validity of our analysis rests on the ability of Cochrane reviewers to identify and assess selective reporting. To address potential concerns on the reliability and validity of Cochrane's assessments, we obtained detailed information about Cochrane's procedures and conducted interviews with Cochrane review authors. These additional investigations provided reassurance regarding Cochrane's methodologies and ratings.
We run several checks to test the robustness of our findings. First, we tested different operationalization of our main variables. For similarity, we considered the absolute difference in the ranking of the drugs alongside both their efficacy and safety performance (Cipriani et al., 2018) . For competitiveness we considered margin of victory (all time and in recent trials), based on the absolute difference between the drugs' safety Odds Ratio and OR=1. Although in our main model we measure rivalry at the level of the dyad of drugs, rivalry may apply also at the level of the firm. Thus, to assess interfirm rivalry, we used measures of firms' similarity (e.g., same location of the HQ) and past interactions (e.g., length of tenure in the same industry). Third, we removed from our sample all trials with sponsorship different from industry (n=19). Finally, we tested a number of additional variables that could affect the engagement in selective reporting (i.e., the number of pages of each paper and the statistical significance of the trial's results) and tangible stakes (i.e., generic entry and availability of the drugs for indications other than depression).
Our key results following the above checks, which are not reported here but available upon request, were largely unchanged.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we explore the implications of rivalry for selective reporting in scientific articles. Unlike prior work that has focused on whether and when firms publish to compete in the marketplace, we argue that competition can influence what is revealed in a publication and what isn't. Specifically, we make use of prior insights on the relational nature of rivalry (Kilduff et al., 2010; Kilduff et al., 2016) and aim to understand the link between such form of rivalry and the content of scientific publications.
Focusing on the context of comparative trials of pharmaceutical drugs, our findings suggest that competing against a rival increases the chances of selective reporting compared to non-rival competitor, independent of tangible stakes. This was generally the case across multiple manipulations of rivalry. Within our sample, the odds of selective reporting were higher for studies comparing drugs involved in repeated competition (OR=1.1, meaning that chances of selective reporting were 10% higher for any additional trial the two drugs had engaged in historically) and drugs that closely matched in prior contests. The effect of similarity was significant but, contrary to our predictions, trials investigating similar drugs were significantly less likely to be subject to selective reporting (OR=0.21, indicating that in our sample selective reporting was 79% less likely in trials investigating similar drugs).
There are many possible explanations for these results. As suggested in prior works on rivalry (Kilduff et al., 2010) , it is possible that certain key differences between competitors might have the effect of fostering greater rivalry, particularly if these differences are key to the rivals' identities. Key similarities, in turn, may reduce the need to demonstrate the superiority of the rivals' identities. In the specific case of clinical trials, due to "class effects" among drugs relying on the same mechanism of action, certain study outcomes may be interpreted as being mutually beneficial or damaging to all competitors (e.g. general safety claims pertaining to SSRIs), in turn reducing the need to resort to selective reporting.
Since the influence of subjective competitive perceptions on withholding information in scientific publications may be constrained to structural competition and to socialization of members in an organization into fierce rivalry (Kilduff, 2019) , we also tested for the effect of two moderators (i.e., firm scientist, leadership at entry). Though the direction of these effects is generally in line with our predictions, the results do not show significance across the range of variation of our rivalry variable. Therefore, we only find partial support for these effects.
Theoretical implications
We believe that this study makes a number of theoretical contributions. First, we contribute to the growing literature on the consequences of the relational nature of rivalry. Specifically, we answer calls to consider rivalry in-profit organizations as well as the consequences of rivalry for unethical behavior (Kilduff et al., 2016) and extend the explorations on the "dark side" of rivalry. By drawing upon existing research on the factors that contribute to rivalry, we are able to shed light on the conditions under which competition is more or less likely to lead to selective reporting. Past research (e.g., Vaughan, 1999) suggests that given the universality of competitive pressures, all organizations may be induced to illegal actions, regardless of their competitive position. As such, exploring the effects of rivalry may offer an interesting perspective in showing that competition is more likely to foster unethical behavior when it entails repeated contests between competitors that have prior history and experience from competitive interactions.
Second, our theoretical framework contributes to the competitive dynamics literature and head-to-head rivalry (Chen and Miller, 2012; Ferrier et al., 1999) . Specifically, we link sources of heterogeneity in competitive behavior to unethical behavior, as an outcome of head-to-head competition. In the context of the awareness-motivation-capability framework (e.g., Chen et al., 2007) , our findings suggest that relational rivalry can increase awareness and motivation to engage in unethical behavior. The insights complement prior work that has largely looked at visible competitive actions in head-to-head rivalry (Ferrier, 2001; , by revealing how different sources of rivalry can shape more subtle elements of such actions (Zahra & Chaples, 1993; Zajac & Bazerman, 1991) . Our results are robust to the inclusion of control variables that capture structural competition (e.g., mutual
forbearance due to multimarket contact).
Third, we expand the understanding of the role of science in firms' attempts to obtain a knowledge-based competitive advantage. In particular, it has been previously suggested that exploring the extent to which competition influences the content of firms' publications (e.g., the efficacy and safety outcomes that firms emphasize in clinical trials), offers a significant research opportunity .Whereas prior work identified the strategic removal of information in publications as a mechanism to prevent knowledge spillover (Nelson, 2016) , we propose that the incentive to encourage adoption of innovations can be another motive for excluding certain research outcomes in scientific articles. Since firms use scientific publications in an attempt to reduce uncertainty for outside parties that are assessing technological innovations (e.g., , we contribute to the recent surge in interest among management scholars on challenges of coping with uncertainty by uncovering a novel trade-off at the interplay between technological competition and science. Specifically, as our insights suggest that the attempt to seek control of external contingencies by reducing uncertainty in one dimension (i.e., the use of scientific information in product-market competition) can increase uncertainty in another (i.e., increase in risk taking for a firm by engaging in substandard reporting), we contribute to the literature on strategic risk management by revealing conditions when marketing activities can increase firm's risk profile (e.g., Aaker & Jacobson, 1990; Jacobson, 1992) .
Finally, we contribute to the broader debates on the antecedents of scientific misconduct (e.g., Biagioli et al., 2018; Lacetera & Zirulia, 2009 ) and factors that inhibit knowledge accumulation (Murray & O'Mahony, 2007) . By identifying rivalry as a crucial factor that relate to such outcomes, we add to the list of factors that inform the transparency and completeness of science publications (e.g., Fanelli, 2009; Franco et al., 2014) .
Limitations and future research
This study has several limitations. First, like most research on misreporting, we use a measure that reflects only misrepresentations that have been detected. In addition, the observed sample includes only studies that were published. Although the instances of selective reporting were probably understated, possibly increasing the conservatism of this study's conclusions, we are unable to disentangle the reasons why firms decided to publish these studies in the first place, and in some cases, in spite of reaching unfavorable results.
Second, pharmaceutical companies engage in strategic decisions regarding whether to pursue antagonistic research agendas and about which comparators are chosen in such projects.
Research, development, and marketing choices may underlie these patterns. Such ex-ante considerations are not investigated in this study. Third, our analysis focuses on the effect of rivalry on the probability of a specific type of misreporting -that of drugs' side effects.
Although this is particularly important, selective reporting may also involve other absent outcomes, such as missing standard deviations. Due to data limitations, these other types of selective reporting and their antecedents are not examined in this analysis.
In addition to addressing these limitations, future work could extend this study in several ways. Whether the relationships observed apply generally or simply reflect the phenomenon studied here is unclear. While withholding information about pharmaceutical drugs is special, strategic reporting of products' features also affects other industries, such as automotive industry (e.g., emissions performance, fuel consumption) and food industry (e.g., undisclosed ingredients). Organizations have been found to disseminate misrepresentations of evidence also outside the pharmaceutical domain; for example, in the tobacco and alcohol industry (e.g., Petticrew, Maani Hessari, Knai, & Weiderpass, 2017) . Also, comparative evidence claims or comparison advertising are frequently used outside pharmaceuticals; for example, in the food and automotive fields. In these contexts, safety is frequently used as a focal comparison point. In addition, due to restrictions in the data and the relatively small sample size, in this study we consider only two-sided rivalry (e.g., at the level of the dyad).
Future studies could allow for the possibility that firms consider the possibility of one-sided rivalry, such that one side considers the other a rival but this is not reciprocated.
Finally, we only find weak support for our moderation effects. Further investigation is required into whether institutional explanations or statistical limitations underlie our exploratory results.
Conclusion
When competing, firms face a variety of decisions about how to behave, how to compete, and how to attempt to increase their chances of victory. The relational nature of rivalry that exists between firms and competition between alternative innovations can affect these decisions. This study's results indicate that relational rivalry can be a powerful motivational force with significant implications for the quality of the reporting of scientific publication. 
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